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Risk disclosure has received considerable attention in today’s business world. 
However, there is a lack of research on the practices and trends of risk disclosure. 
Therefore, there is a need to examine the trend of risk disclosure over years as well as 
the determinant and consequence of risk disclosure. In particular, this study examined 
risk disclosure level, the influence of corporate governance on the risk disclosure level, 
and the impact of risk disclosure level on cost of equity capital. The secondary data for 
the study were based on annual reports, DataStream and Capital IQ of firms from non-
financial firms listed on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia from 2001 to 2011. Level of 
disclosure was measured using content analysis. Two empirical analyses were examined 
using multiple regressions. The content analysis findings confirmed a trend toward 
greater levels of risk disclosure. Firms disclosed risk on financial, non-financial and risk 
management framework respectively. Most of the information disclosed is either neutral 
or good, while bad news was infrequently reported. Firms risk disclosure also includes 
both monetary and non-monetary disclosures and firms tend to report more information 
about past risks rather than future risks. The results of the first empirical analysis show 
the significant and positive relationship between board size, independent non-executive 
directors, and audit committee independence with risk disclosure level but there is no 
significant relationship with ownership structure and race of the chairman. The second 
empirical analysis suggests firms with high level of risk disclosure will yield lower cost 
of equity capital. Overall, findings are consistent with political cost theory, agency 
theory, capital need theory and signaling theory. The findings have shown the 
importance of risk disclosure practices and it is recommended that policy makers, 
authorities and boards of directors to consider the disclosure of risk in a firm’s annual 
reports as a priority. 
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ABSTRAK 
Pendedahan risiko telah mendapat perhatian dalam dunia perniagaan hari ini. 
Walau bagaimanapun, masih terdapat kekurangan kajian mengenai amalan dan arah 
aliran pendedahan risiko. Oleh itu, terdapat keperluan untuk mengkaji arah aliran 
pendedahan risiko dan juga penentu dan akibat daripada pendedahan risiko. Secara 
khususnya, kajian ini meneliti tahap pendedahan  risiko, pengaruh tadbir urus korporat 
kepada tahap pendedahan risiko, dan kesan tahap pendedahan risiko kepada kos modal 
ekuiti. Data sekunder untuk kajian ini adalah berdasarkan laporan tahunan, Datastream 
dan Capital IQ firma-firma dari syarikat bukan kewangan yang disenaraikan di Papan 
Utama Bursa Malaysia dari tahun 2001 hingga 2011. Tahap pendedahan diukur 
menggunakan analisis kandungan. Dua analisis empirikal telah diuji menggunakan 
regresi pelbagai. Dapatan kajian analisis kandungan mengesahkan arah aliran 
pendedahan risiko ke tahap yang lebih tinggi. Firma mendedahkan risiko masing-masing 
berkaitan kewangan, bukan kewangan dan kerangkakerja pengurusan risiko. 
Kebanyakan maklumat yang didedahkan adalah sama ada neutral atau baik, manakala 
berita yang buruk jarang dilaporkan. Pendedahan risiko firma juga termasuk kedua-dua 
pendedahan berdasarkan  kewangan dan bukan kewangan dan firma-firma cenderung 
untuk melaporkan lebih banyak maklumat mengenai risiko yang lepas berbanding 
dengan risiko pada masa hadapan. Keputusan analisis empirikal yang pertama 
menunjukkan hubungan yang signifikan dan positif antara saiz lembaga pengarah, 
pengarah bukan eksekutif bebas, dan kebebasan jawatankuasa audit dengan tahap 
pendedahan risiko tetapi tiada hubungan yang signifikan dengan struktur pemilikan dan 
etnik pengerusi. Analisis empirikal kedua mencadangkan firma dengan tahap 
pendedahan risiko yang tinggi akan menghasilkan kos modal yang lebih rendah. Secara 
keseluruhan, dapatan adalah konsisten dengan teori politik kos, teori agensi, teori 
keperluan modal dan teori isyarat. Dapatan kajian telah menunjukkan kepentingan 
amalan pendedahan risiko dan dicadangkan supaya pembuat dasar, pihak berkuasa dan 
lembaga pengarah untuk mengambilkira pendedahan risiko dalam laporan tahunan firma 
sebagai satu keutamaan. 
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  CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview 
This chapter provide introduction to the study, which is organized by the 
following sections: Section 1.2 provides the background of the study. Section 1.3 
introduced and discusses the problem statements, while section 1.4 and section 1.5 
focus on the research objectives and questions, followed by section 1.6 that highlights 
the significant of the study. Section 1.7 and section 1.8 explain the scope of the study 
and the outline of the thesis. The chapter concludes with a conclusion of the chapter 
in section 1.9. Section 1.10 provides the terminologies of the study.  
1.2 Background of the Study 
Risk is referred to as the uncertainties that are linked to a potential loss or 
profit (Cabedo and Tirado, 2004; CICA, 2002; IASB, 2005; ICAEW, 1997; Linsley 
and Shrives, 2005; Solomon et al., 2000). Organizations are facing various types of 
risks and the need to prioritize those risks is an important component of the risk 
management operation (ICAEW, 1997). Risk management is a critical component in 
business; and incorporates identifying and measuring risks. Santomero (2007) 
suggested that in order to implement a sound risk management system in an 
organization, it is important to include risks reports in the organization’s financial 
reports and to present to shareholders and regulators. Raghavan (2003) added that it is 
necessary for organizations to disclose adequate risk information since it would help 
potential investors to examine the strategies adopted by the organizations in this area. 
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Thus, the identifying, managing and disclosing of risks have been the recent focus of 
lawmakers, policy makers and mandatory reporting procedures applied in the 
international context (Hill and Short, 2009). Risk reporting information has been 
disclosed based on some regulatory framework. At the same time, some companies 
disclose extra information voluntarily. Greater risk disclosure will enable firms to be 
more transparent. Users of corporate reports are also able to assess the risk profile of 
the firm to make better investment decisions. This will reduce information asymmetry 
leading to a decrease in the cost of equity capital (Botosan, 1997; Chen and Gao, 
2010; Hail, 2002; Solomon et al., 2000).  
Institutions that set standards for risk reporting and disclosure in companies’ 
annual reports have given considerable focus to risk reporting, due to the critical 
nature of risk. However, it has been found that the availability of risk information is 
still inadequate in these reports (Abraham and Cox, 2007; Amran et al., 2009; 
Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Konishi and Ali, 2007; Lajili and Zéghal, 2005; 
Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Oliveira et al., 2011a; Woods and Reber, 2003). In fact, 
the users of the annual reports have increased their demand for the availability of 
such information in annual reports so that they can assess the organizations’ risk 
profiles better (Linsley and Shrives, 2000, 2005; Solomon et al., 2000). Given the 
increased request for more risk information, regulators and other involved parties are 
playing a bigger role in introducing new policies that could enhance the risk reporting 
system (AICPA, 1994; ASB, 1993, 2003, 2006; CICA, 2002; ICAEW, 1997, 1999b, 
2002). In Malaysia, argument on risk management and its requirement for disclosure 
can be clearly established in the Financial Reporting Act 1997 and Bursa Malaysia 
listing requirements (Amran et al., 2009). The listing requirements suggest that listed 
firms are obligated to disclose their financial, operation and management information 
in their annual reports for a particular financial period so that stakeholders and 
investors would be able to assess the performance of the firm. 
Several empirical studies provide evidence that various firm determinants 
affect corporate risk disclosure levels (Elshandidy et al., 2013). For corporate 
governance mechanisms, Taylor et al. (2010) argued that firms with strong corporate 
governance structure are more effective in financial risk management; that is reflected 
as enhanced financial risk disclosures. In the Malaysian context, the code of corporate 
3 
governance highlights the importance of companies to disclose their risks in the 
annual report (Amran et al., 2009). Investigation on the corporate governance factors 
and the level of risk disclosure is one of the interesting areas for researchers which 
leads to the appearance of a number of studies in accounting literature that focus on 
clarifying the effect of best practice and corporate governance codes on the risk 
disclosure level.  
A greater disclosure reduces the information asymmetry and investor 
uncertainty, resulting in a positive effect to reduce the firm’s cost of equity capital 
(Botosan, 1997; Chen and Gao, 2010; Easley et al., 2001; Eaton et al., 2007; Hail, 
2002; Shi and Kim, 2007). Companies can be transparent and reduce uncertainties 
through identifying, managing, analyzing and evaluating risks, which will be useful 
for assisting corporate reports users and investors in the capital market to understand 
the risk profiles. These functions will help them to accurately assess a firm’s financial 
condition and performance (Cabedo and Tirado, 2004; Lev and Zarowin, 1999; 
Solomon et al., 2000). Another argument by Lev (1988), Akerlof (1970) and Shi and 
Kim (2007) holds that the disclosure is important for any function in capital markets. 
Any kind of disclosure such as risk helps well-known, confident and well-informed 
investors to make decisions accurately in the stock market (Cabedo and Tirado, 2004; 
Deumes, 2008). There is a negative link between the cost of equity capital and the 
level of disclosure in the countries with low disclosure environment (Kristandl and 
Bontis, 2007; Lopes and de Alencar, 2010). Managers in such countries are persuaded 
to offer a greater disclosure on a voluntary basis to reduce the uncertainty among the 
stakeholders and investors (Souissi and Khlif, 2012). Therefore, along with this 
development, there is a growing need for disclosing firms’ information particularly 
risk disclosure. Previous researches (Solomon et al., 2000, Linsly and Shrives 2006) 
provide evidence that investors regard the disclosed information by the firm (risk 
information is considered as the critical part of this information) as an important 
source of decision making.  In line with this; the statement of the problem is the 
subject of discussion in the following section. 
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1.3 Problem Statements 
Given the rapid changes occurring in global business and their effect on 
society and governments, the demand for information has also grown tremendously. 
A major transformation was observed following the financial crisis in South East 
Asian economies in 1997. The financial crisis affected the South East Asian countries 
badly resulting in major losses, which lowered the confidence level of investors in the 
stock markets. In Malaysia, because of this crisis, the government decided to improve 
policies so that the economy could be improved and to bolster investor confidence in 
the capital market. In 1998, the National Economic Action Council (NEAC) was set 
up to initiate plans for sustained growth in the country. The NEAC proposed plans to 
improve firms’ corporate governance, transparency, and accountability in order to 
regain market confidence (Mohd Ghazali and Weetman, 2006).  
The government of Malaysia, in 1998, incorporated a high level Finance 
Committee to assess corporate governance in order to improve the process. The 
Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance (MICG) was established at the same 
time to create awareness and provide information regarding corporate governance. 
The Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) which was established in 
1999 shows the best practices for corporate governance, however, in the earlier years, 
adhering to the MCGG was encouraged but not enforced. The Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange (KLSE), in 2001, enforced a ruling that needed companies with their 
financial year end after the 30th of June 2001 to comply with the MCCG 
requirement, to highlight their risk management strategies and internal controls in 
their annual reports. Later on, MCCG 2007 and MCCG 2012 were introduced. In a 
survey by Mohd Ghazali (2012), 35.6% of the responding companies had a risk 
management committee following the MCCG (2007) revision of their policies. This 
shows a positive outlook on the companies’ part in establishing corporate governance 
in the country.  
As such, according to the Financial Reporting Act of 1997, based on the 
corporate governance code, firms had to develop an explicit risk management 
disclosure plan that must include financial, management and operation disclosure, so 
5 
that the stakeholders and investors would be able to assess firm performance. 
Additionally, they had to include three areas of reporting namely, the practiced 
corporate governance, the level of internal controls and risk management, and 
mitigation plans. In addition and according to the role of accounting standards as 
provided by MASB (Malaysian Accounting Standards Board), companies had been 
mandated to adhere to the standards which highlighted that the highest risk matters 
must be disclosed in annual reports, as stated in MASB24 in Jan 2002, MASB8 in Jan 
2002, FRS124 in Oct 2006; FRS132 in 2006; FRS 137 in July 2007; FRS7 in 2010; 
and FRS139 in 2010. Another regulatory body by the Securities Commission 
regulations, mandated that the company holds exchange in the capital market must 
also disclose all risks associated with the investors and company (section 212 in the 
Capital Markets and Services Act 2007).  
According to political costs theory, a company is required to meet any 
requirement from regulators in disclosing information, which supports investors of 
the company to make perfect decision. The regulations on risk disclosure are methods 
to increase the standard of disclosure. Policies are very much needed in an imperfect 
markets, whereas, in a perfect market such implementations may not be required. 
Healy and Palepu (2001) suggested that policies on disclosure are needed to create a 
more efficient market and they have an influence on the credibility of the financial 
reporting system. In line with political cost theory, this study aimed to address the 
contextual gap, as there have been not many studies in imperfect market and 
developing country context, to investigate the amount and type of information 
revealed in annual reports. 
There is a limited number of studies investigated the trend of risk disclosure 
(Rajab and Handley-Schachler, 2009). It is difficult to make a comparison on the 
levels of risk disclosure between different nations, because the regulations differ from 
one to the other.  However, studies on trend of risk disclosure of a particular nation 
over years will be beneficial to determine the strength and weaknesses of the current 
rules. To the knowledge of the author, there is no study which investigated the trend 
of risk disclosure over the recent years in the Malaysian companies’ context. Hence, 
this research intended to investigate the trend of risk reporting over a period of 11 
years to examine whether reporting in annual reports are in line with the regulators 
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guidelines and also meet the requirements of the various accounting bodies in 
Malaysia following the financial crisis in 1997. It examined if there were any changes 
and variations of risk disclosure practices in annual reports. It is necessary to explore 
the development of risk disclosure in view of new policies, rules, standards setters 
and corporate governance practices. According to political costs theory an 
organization’s risk disclosure reporting should be reflective of the new policies made 
by regulators.  
According to Schipper (1991), the agency theory anticipates that certain 
disclosures in annual reports could be used as a tool to decrease the monitoring costs 
of shareholders and reduce the problems of moral hazards. Disclosure is used as a 
tool in decreasing the unwanted impacts of moral hazards and selection allegations. 
Disclosure is a tool to motivate shareholders and related stakeholders that the firm is 
properly managed and is made accountable. Disclosure tends to reduce agency cost 
and improve the confidence of the investors in firms as well as decrease information 
asymmetry. The agency theory suggests that agency cost differs according to the 
firm’s corporate governance factors. Agency theory is quite useful in describing the 
uncertainty and risk disclosure. Knowing the risks that are disclosed would enable the 
investors to manage risk diversification well. This study investigated the usefulness 
of risk disclosure according to the agency theory and addressed the gap in the 
literature to support and describe risk disclosure practices in a developing country.  
Most of the previous studies have been conducted in developed countries with a 
perfect market. The development of CG codes in Malaysia has led the author to 
examine the relationship between CG and risk disclosure. It was expected that 
improvement in CG practices would increase level of risk disclosure which in turn 
lead to a reduction in conflict and agency costs.  
Given the current financial developments and accounting requirements, the 
area of risk reporting has gained a lot of attention from accounting researchers. They 
focus on prospectus (Deumes, 2008; ICAEW, 1999b; Papa, 2007), quantitative 
method, and various classification (Dunne et al., 2007; Jorion, 2002; Li and Gao, 
2007; Linsmeier and Pearson, 1997; Linsmeier et al., 2002; Mohd Ghazali, 2012; 
Rajgopal, 1999; Roulstone, 1999; Seow and Tam, 2002). Several studies have 
concentrated on risk information and assessed the disclosure of risk in annual reports. 
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Woods and Reber (2003) and Berger and Gleißner (2010) studied the area of 
disclosure of risk in annual reports but they failed to investigate the potential 
variables of the disclosure. On the other hand, several studies carried on risk 
disclosure determinants, that examine the relationship of factors that included board 
composition, environmental sensitivity, audit committee, ownership structure, size, 
profitability, leverage, and auditor quality with the extent of risk disclosure (Abraham 
and Cox, 2007; Abraham et al., 2007; Amran et al., 2009; Beretta and Bozzolan, 
2004; Elshandidy et al., 2013a; Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Konishi and Ali, 2007; 
Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Mousa and Elamir, 2014; Oliveira et al., 2011a; Rajab and 
Handley-Schachler, 2009) however, some of the results were inconclusive and there 
were many other factors that were not considered.  
In Malaysia, studies on risk disclosure are still limited. A study by Mohd 
Ghazali (2012) examined the perspective of corporate managers in a survey related to 
disclosure of risk and risk management. Another study by Amran et al. (2009) 
investigated only a few company characteristics such as industry, leverage and size in 
Malaysia. There are many other variables that could be studied. This study extended 
previous research by adding more variables of corporate governance, which is still 
under researched. Four corporate governance variables (ownership structure, board 
size, independent non-executive directors, and audit committee independence) were 
chosen due to lack of studies on them to date. These are exploratory variables in 
Malaysia and inconclusive, mixed results by previous findings, with several of the 
relationships not well established resulting in the absence of consensus among the 
researchers. Based on cultural theory which  discusses religion and race effect on the 
corporate behavior and reporting practices; as such the policies for disclosure might 
be affected by a person’s religion, race and behavior based on cultural aspects 
(Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Mohd Ghazali, 2004). So there is need to explore this 
relationship. According to Mohd Ghazali (2004) and Haniffa and Cooke (2002), there 
is a positive and significant relation between the number of directors on a board who 
are Malays and voluntary disclosure in annual reports in Malaysian firms. This study 
was anticipating similar outcomes in the practice of risk disclosure and proposing that 
there is a relationship between race of chairman on a board who are Malays and 
Muslim and risk disclosure level.   
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The issue of whether indeed it is beneficial for a company to increase 
disclosure via a reduced capital cost remains a controversy among company 
management, policy makers and scholars. This is regardless of the fact that the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants’ final reporting committee in 
1994 states that greater disclosure leads to a lowering of cost of capital. Moreover, 
Beyer and Guttman (2012) fuel the uncertainty of such a relationship between 
increased level of disclosure and lowering of cost of capital  by maintaining that this 
issue is still a question of interest among accountants and financial analysts in the 
literature.  
The debate on the relationship between disclosure and cost of equity capital 
continues unabated. Theory has provided a strong support for the negative association 
between these two variables (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Easley and O'hara, 
2004). Some theorists such as capital need theory and signaling theory argue that 
more disclosure will result in lowered cost of equity capital due to the reduced 
estimates of risks and transaction costs (Armitage and Marston, 2007; Botosan, 1997; 
Chen and Gao, 2010). Many empirical studies have been conducted since 1997 to try 
and support the theory.  At the onset, the literature provided evidence of works that 
highlighted how voluntary disclosure was associated with cost of equity capital 
particularly in developed markets such as the USA (Botosan, 1997), Canada 
(Richardson and Welker, 2001), Switzerland (Botosan and Plumlee, 2002; Hail, 
2002) and the UK (Gietzmann and Ireland, 2005). Not so long ago, emergent markets 
and civil law countries have also shown much interest in this topic, Zhang and Ding 
(2006) in China; Espinosa and Trombetta (2007) in Spain; Kristandl and Bontis 
(2007) in Austria, Germany, Sweden; Déjean and Martinez (2009) in France; 
(Embong et al., 2012) in Malaysia, Lopes and de Alencar (2010) in Brazil and  
Miihkinen (2013) in Finland). Despite all the work done, substantial empirical 
evidence is still lacking and the many inconclusive and varying results leave the 
question of the association between corporate disclosure and cost of equity capital 
still unanswered.   
Therefore, in terms of risk reporting, the current literature only offers a partial 
concern of risk disclosure practices, its features and governing factors. A few studies 
by Chen and Gao (2010) and Rajab (2009) examined the effect of risk disclosure on 
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cost of equity capital and they found mixed results and there is no similar argument 
for this relationship. Therefore, there is a need for more studies to conclude the result 
between risk disclosure and cost of equity capital. There is a crucial need for the 
examination of how this information is being disclosed and to find out the potential 
benefits of disclosure of risk information such as in the impact it has on the firm’s 
cost of capital. Moreover, there is a lack in the studies of the potential influence of 
risk disclosure on the components of cost of equity capital. Hence, this study aims to 
address this gap in the accounting literature as it concentrates on the situation in 
Malaysia in order to discover the association between the extent of risk disclosure and 
cost of equity capital.  
Furthermore, unlike previous studies (Amran et al., 2009) that used risk 
categories, which are mainly utilized for the developed countries, this is the first 
study that used risk categories, which is more suitable for Malaysia. The categories 
for risk disclosure in this study was based on Oliveria et al. (2011a) which has been 
assured for validity and reliability of content analysis tested  in the emerging market. 
This study also addresses the methodological gap by studying risk disclosure based 
on the following classification that is more suitable for emerging market: financial, 
nonfinancial, and risk management framework and also the economic sign (monetary, 
non-monetary), type of measure (past, future), outlook (good, bad, neutral), and type 
of disclosure (voluntary, mandatory).  
1.4 Research Justification  
Given the current financial developments and accounting requirements, the 
area of risk reporting has gained considerable attention by accounting researchers. 
Even though there have been many studies covering this topic, the focus of each of 
these studies differed. Some of the past studies have investigated risk disclosure  
specifically in financial statements based on a quantitative method and others have 
concentrated on various classifications of risk (Jorion, 2002; Li and Gao, 2007; Mohd 
Ghazali, 2012; Rajgopal, 1999; Seow and Tam, 2002). Several studies have 
concentrated on a more  general approach to risk information and assessed the 
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disclosure of risk in annual reports (Abraham and Cox, 2007; Lajili and Zéghal, 
2005; Linsley and Shrives, 2005, 2006) and in prospectus (Deumes, 2008; Papa, 
2007). However, the researches on the broader area of risk information are limited. 
For example, Lajili and Zéghal (2005); Woods and Reber (2003) and Berger and 
Gleißner (2010) studied the area of disclosure of risk in annual reports but they failed 
to investigate the potential determinants of the disclosure. Linsley and Shrives (2005) 
investigated the disclosure of risk among non-financial based UK firms; besides risk 
level and firm size, they did not assess any other determinants. On the other hand, 
several researches carried on risk disclosure determinants such as corporate 
governance and companies characteristic have yielded inconsistent findings 
(Abraham and Cox, 2007; Abraham et al, 2007; Amran et al., 2009; Beretta and 
Bozzolan, 2004; Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Konishi and Ali, 2007; Linsley and 
Shrives, 2006; Oliveira et al., 2011a; Rajab and Handley-Schachler, 2009). 
The area of literature on accounting disclosure shows some of the current and 
past issues that have been examined includes finding out what is contained within the 
reports by the firms, the rudimentary issues that have an influence on the information 
contained with the reports and the motivation behind firms reporting on such 
disclosure of information.  Even though there have been extensive studies on the area 
of types of risk related information is being disclosed, there is a crucial need for the 
examination of how these information is being disclosed and to find out the corporate 
governance factors which influence the level of risk disclosure and potential benefits 
of disclosure of risk information on the firm’s cost of equity capital.  The existing 
literature only provides a portion of disclosure practices, its characteristics and factors 
that govern it in terms of reporting risk; however, there are not many studies to show 
the influence of disclosing the risk information and its effects on the company's cost 
of equity capital. Thus, this research aims to address this gap. The first objective of 
this study is to research about risk disclosure practices in the corporate world by 
studying the annual report for eleven consecutive years (2001-2011), to figure out 
whether or not there is a difference between the variety and extent of disclosure over 
time, and hence this can be classified as a longitudinal study. The main intention is to 
draw a clear picture regarding the volume and type of altering patterns of reporting 
and hence focus on the limitations of reporting risk. Even though previous literature 
has explored risk disclosure, a limited number of them have examined it from a point 
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of view of current trends and whether companies have been able to react to the 
external pressure and demand for information related to risk. It is interesting to 
research about how risk disclosure has evolved over the past years as a response to 
the creation of the new codes of corporate governance, hence addressing the gap 
created by political cost theory. The existing studies on different types of disclosure 
including social and environmental indicates that corporate social reporting has risen 
in time due to various factors. Haniffa and Cooke (2005) believed that some of these 
factors could include increased legislation events, pressure group activities, politics 
and social awareness. The risk reporting of a firm must develop based on the codes 
and rules of corporate governance in the past few years.  
The second aim of this research was to provide an explanation for any 
variations in the risk disclosure and analyze what elements determine the degree of 
risk disclosure.  Accounting researchers have always been curious about the link 
between disclosure and its determinants. The degree of corporate disclosure can be 
affected by various components including financial and non-financial, social and 
corporate governance factors. But, a number of the relationships between the factors 
have not been proven valid in the existing literature. However, the results and 
conclusions of prior studies provide good starting point to develop and understand the 
relationship between risk disclosure and the fundamental organizational elements. 
The third goal of the study was to analyze the actual usefulness of disclosing 
risk in the annual reports. Earlier researches and studies provide a perspective into the 
perceived benefits and costs along with perceived usefulness of disclosure. Gray and 
Roberts (1989), Ajili and Zeghal (2005), Soussie and Khalif (2012), AICPA (1994) 
for instance, insisted that disclosure helps develop a positive brand image as well as 
aid in making the right business decisions. Disclosure can also be regarded as one of 
the methods to reduce adverse selection by mitigating the information imbalance 
between the managers (or preparers) and the investors (or users). Disclosure helps to 
reduce the firm's cost of capital and transaction costs (which has resulted from lower 
bid-ask spreads) while increasing share liquidity. Furthermore, proper disclosure also 
allows organizations to maintain positive relationships with all their stakeholders in 
order to preserve their support. In addition, disclosure also helps in keeping clear of 
regulatory pressure and hence allows firms to avoid further requirements.  
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The corporate reporting community has always been curious regarding 
whether the greater the level of disclosure of a company would result is a lower cost 
of equity for the firm. However this issue has been much debated upon (Botosan, 
1997; Sossie and Khalif, 2001). The theoretical discussions state that greater 
disclosure is related to lower cost of equity because of the reduced estimation risk and 
lowered transaction costs. The ICAEW also supports full disclosure, as they believe 
that a company that discloses risk information will create a brand image of them 
being riskier than prior to disclosure. The disclosure of risk motivates its management 
and decreases the volatility of the stock; hence, reducing the firm’s cost of capital. 
The reporting of risk information is crucial especially for potential investors. The 
more aware they are of the potential risks, the better they would be able to attach 
value and determine the cost of capital for the firm. However, as a drawback, this 
theory does not have sufficient empirical evidence to substantiate it. For instance, the 
Jenkins committee notes that the greatest benefit of risk disclosure is the reduced cost 
of capital (AICPA, 1994). On the other hand, the financial executive institute (Berton, 
1994; Botosan, 1997) stated that increased disclosure would target the stock traders 
hence, increasing the volatility of the share price and as a result increasing risk which 
results in higher equity capital cost.  
In the report from ICAEW (1999b) a number of skeptics underline the fact 
that “a more accurate capital cost does not necessarily mean a lower capital cost and 
an increase is level of disclosure might result in increased cost of capital ICAEW 
(1999b). It can also be said that firms that do have higher risk rates may not be 
hesitant to disclose such information because they do not wish to draw attention to 
their riskiness but rather wish to divert attention from it. Other evidence such as 
Armitage and Marston’s (2007), show that finance representatives do not believe that 
there is not a clear relationship between cost of equity and levels of disclosure 
because their respective companies already disclose enough information. It can be 
reasoned that it is when the potential investors feel as though the information 
disclosed by the company is valid and credible will the risk disclosure in annual 
report have any effect on reducing the firm's cost of capital. Although the disclosure 
of risk is mandatory in annual-reports, the latest regulations provide the company 
with the power to only disclose certain amounts and levels of risk information. This 
means that the active disclosure of right information depends on the willingness of 
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the manager (Deumes, 2008). After reviewing the current studies and literature 
(ICAEW, 1997, 2004b; Linsly and Shrives, 2000; Woods and Reber, 2003, Lajili and 
Zegal, 2005), it becomes evident that there still is a need for empirical work to 
investigate the effect of risk disclosure on a firm’s cost of equity capital. For the 
Malaysian context, this is a first study which elaborates the risk reporting practices 
over eleven year to investigate the trend of risk disclosure keeping in line with 
regulatory development. It could also be the first study that investigates the corporate 
governance factors and risk disclosure as well as the effect of risk disclosure on the 
cost of equity capital and its proxies. The following sections provide the research 
questions and objectives. 
1.5 Research Questions 
The following are the research questions answered in this study: 
RQ1: What is the trend of risk disclosure in the Malaysian non-financial 
companies’ annual report over 11 years? 
RQ2: Does corporate governance factors such as ownership structure, board 
size, independent non-executive directors, audit committee independence, and 
race of chairman on the board influence level of risk disclosure?   
RQ3: Do the risk disclosure practices affect the cost of equity capital from the                        
years 2001-2011 in Malaysian non-financial companies? 
1.6 Research Objectives 
This study aims to achieve the following objectives:  
Objective 1: To investigate the trend of risk disclosure in Malaysian 
companies’ annual report over 11 years from 2001-2011.  
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Objective 2: To investigate the association of corporate governance factors 
such as ownership structure, board size, independent non-executive directors, 
audit committee independence, and race of chairman on the board on the 
extent of risk disclosure. 
Objective 3: To investigate the impact of risk disclosure practices on the cost 
of equity capital for the years 2001-2011 in Malaysian non-financial 
companies.  
1.7 Significance of the Study 
After reviewing the current theories, this research adds to the current literature 
by examining the disclosure of risk in terms of the risk types by comparing the risk 
disclosure for a period of eleven years. Longitudinal studies are important as the 
previous studies are not so relevant to the current objective (ICAEW, 1999). This 
longitudinal research, that examines the extent of risk disclosure, aims to analyze and 
comprehend the evidence of risk disclosure.  Furthermore, the study further 
contributes to the existing literature by analyzing the way firms have reacted and 
responded to new corporate governance laws and regulatory pressure. The reporting 
structure must reflect the new rules of corporate governance and other pressures that 
have taken place in recent years. 
This gap in contemporary and past literature must be addressed in order to 
examine how companies respond to changing regulations; not only to test their 
compliance with the changes, but also to see whether they meet the needs of different 
kinds of users. For this, it is hoped that this research will provide an answer to the 
various queries raised regarding improving the disclosure of risk. 
Solomon et al. (2000) stated that an increase in the risk disclosure would be 
regarded as evidence of, and exhibit compliance with new corporate governance laws. 
It is imperative to be up-to-date with the way attitude of firms have changed toward 
risk disclosure over time. There are various factors that impact the amount of 
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information a company wishes to disclose, a few of which include advancement in 
technology, increasing global competition, new accounting standards among many 
others. The study of risk disclosure practices helps to understand whether the 
financial reporting community can view this as an area of best practices (Deumes, 
2008). Some users might want to broaden their investigations and provide validity for 
these reporting practices. Furthermore, another benefit of this research is that it 
provides the investors with an objective method of evaluating the company's 
reporting practices. It is essential for investors to examine and comprehend the 
potential risks and how they are managed by the company. Risk disclosure also 
allows the investor to have an idea about the firm's future cash flows; its timing and 
amount. In addition, the increased disclosure would inevitably attract the users’ 
attention. The results of the study can be of help to all types of users such as standard 
setters in setting the requirements and developing the framework of corporate risk 
disclosure. 
Based on the first objective, this study refers to the body of knowledge on the 
subject of risk disclosure and all that it entails. First, based on the political cost theory 
this study argued that it is important to have more risk disclosure in annual reports to 
improve the credibility of public financial reporting in both imperfect and perfect 
markets. This study will enlarge on the role of disclosure in political cost theory 
(including disclosure of risk). This is necessary in an imperfect market to increase the 
market’s efficiency. The study results will add to political cost theory to enable the 
creation of new policies for disclosure of risk that eventually lead to greater 
confidence in the capital market. Second, to the best of the author’s knowledge, no 
previous studies have examined the trend of risk disclosure over 11 years in 
Malaysia. This study has contributed to knowledge in this field by enhancing the 
understanding of the idea of risk disclosure. This was enabled by the comprehensive 
review of the existing literature, classifying the types of risk and similar aspects of 
risk disclosure, and finally examining the development of policies and regulatory 
bodies in relation to risk disclosure in the Malaysian context. Third, this study 
enhanced understanding of the idea that meeting the demands of users with regard to 
yearly reports requires improvement in risk disclosure. The necessity to improve risk 
disclosure is not only a result of new regulations; other stakeholders have also 
demanded it in the wake of the Asian financial crisis of 1997. Fourth, this study also 
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makes methodological contributions to fill the methodological gap by previous study 
which was done by Amran et al. (2009) in the Malaysian context; through studying 
the benefits of risk disclosure in the following aspects: financial, nonfinancial, and 
risk management framework and also the economic sign (monetary, non-monetary), 
type of measure (past, future), outlook (good, bad, neutral), type of disclosure 
(voluntary, mandatory). These categories are more suitable for the Malaysian context 
as they have been used in the emerging market by Oliveria et al. (2011a). Fifth, this 
study helps regulatory bodies to know how effective their regulations are in the 
development of risk disclosure. The results of this study show that mandatory risk 
disclosure is higher than voluntary risk disclosure in Malaysia, but it is still 
inadequate when compared to developed countries. Sixth, another contribution of this 
study is that it provides important evidence of the need to revise the current 
regulations and standards to enhance the quality of risk disclosure to meet 
international standards and policies.  
This study adds to the contemporary literature by finding out the elements 
determining risk disclosure. Furthermore, this study will be beneficial to both the 
investors and the regulators as it helps them understand the types of information 
companies disclose in various sectors, and through finding the corporate governance 
factors of the firms disclosing such information. Based on the second objective, the 
study refers to the body of knowledge by examining risk disclosure in a number of 
ways. First, this study refers to agency theory and cultural theory which focus on the 
monitoring role of corporate governance best practices in companies. The results of 
the study indicate that conflict and the monitoring role increase the agency cost. 
Agency theory suggests that disclosure by managers (principals) can help reduce 
conflict cost (owner manager and owner debt-holder) by disclosing more information, 
increasing investors’ and shareholders’ confidence, and reducing agency cost. 
Therefore, this study aims to fill theoretical gaps of both agency theory and cultural 
theory as to the best knowledge of this researcher, no study has examined these 
theories in an emerging market. In the Malaysian context, the monitoring role of 
corporate governance helps companies decrease conflict, while increased risk 
disclosure and development help reduce agency cost and increase investor confidence 
in the capital market. In addition, this study supplies proof that there are essential 
factors that impact disclosure of risk in Malaysian companies. Also, to the best of this 
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researcher’s knowledge, no research has studied the relationship between the factors 
of corporate governance and risk disclosure in the Malaysian setting. This study 
signified to audit committee independence, independent non-executive directors, 
board size, ownership structure and race of chairman. Another significance of this 
study is related to the common discussion in previous research in relation to 
ownership structure, board size, independent non-executive directors, independence 
of audit committees, and race of chairman of the board.  
This study contributes to other literature by analyzing the usefulness of 
disclosed information through empirical examination of the effect risk disclosure has 
on a firm’s cost of equity capital. Only if the disclosed information in the annual 
report is actually useful to the investor will there - be a substantial relationship 
between the level of risk disclosure in annual report and the cost of equity. Other 
researches such as Botosan, (1997); Botosan and Blumlee, (2002); Hail, (2002); Chen 
et al. (2003) analyzed various types of disclosure such as investors’ relation, 
corporate governance, environmental disclosure and financial gap disclosure with the 
particular focus of the study being on risk disclosure. Based on the third objective, 
this study refers to the link between risk disclosure and cost of equity capital. This 
contributes to the existing body of knowledge in a number of ways; first, this study 
adds to the capital need theory and signaling theory as the results suggested that 
market pressure plays a role in increasing the number of capital offers and drawing 
new investors. Furthermore, decreasing capital costs results in less asymmetry of 
information in the market, thus reducing potential investors’ transaction costs, bid-ask 
spreads, and stock price volatility; therefore this study contributes to this theory to fill 
the gap in research on emerging markets because to the best knowledge of the 
researcher, there is no study that has examined it in emerging markets and no 
previous research has explored the relationship between risk disclosure level and cost 
of equity capital and its proxies in the context of Malaysia, which is an emerging and 
imperfect market also in addition to the development of different methods to estimate 
the cost of equity capital. Also, the results can support the widespread expectation 
mentioned in the previous literature that corporate disclosure leads to a lower cost of 
equity capital; the results can prove that risk disclosure is related to proxies of cost of 
equity capital (stock price volatility and stock return trading) for better estimation of 
cost of equity capital and its components. 
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In general, this study’s main theoretical contribution was finding the linkage 
between political cost theory and agency theory, so the study results indicate that risk 
disclosure is a mechanism for conflict reduction and improving public financial 
reporting to lessen asymmetry in information. According to capital need theory and 
signaling theory the reduction of information asymmetry reduces cost of equity 
capital, leading to stock price volatility and more stock trading turnover (liquid 
market). The study results also contributed to cultural theory in the Malaysian setting. 
The findings of this study show that governmental controls are a much more 
influential factor in promoting risk disclosure when compared to the personalities of 
board members. Also, the findings of the study will be useful to the authorities 
concerned with setting accounting standards, setting who will be motivated to revise 
and improve accounting standards and traditional accounting practices. They can also 
standardize the rules of the contemporary competitive business environment, and help 
recognize risk disclosure as a mechanism to reduce information asymmetry between 
companies and the capital market. More disclosure of risk would facilitate regulations 
and reforms as well as the recommendations of specialized institutions. Moreover, 
this research’s results have other possible effects for firms. Among these effects is 
that risk disclosure can be beneficial in the capital market in reducing equity capital 
costs and stock price volatility. In addition, it can help increase stock trading 
turnover. All of these factors encourage businesses to engage in good practices such 
as voluntary risk disclosure. Table 1.1 provides the summary of this research.  
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Table ‎1.1: Summary of this Research 
Research 
Gap 
RQs Findings Conclusion Contribution Implication 
There is no 
previous study 
to find the 
practices and 
trend of risk 
disclosure over 
recent years in 






variation of risk 
disclosure over 11 






results verified that 
there is a growing 
trend for greater 




-The findings show 
that mandatory 
disclosure was 
allotted the largest 










reports but it 
is still 
insufficient.  
-To the political cost theory that the narrative 
role of disclosure (including risk disclosure) is 
much more needed in an imperfect market to 
create a much more efficient market and 
confidence in the capital market. 
 
-Understanding of concept of risk disclosure 
and practices in Malaysia (rules, standards and 
development process) and various demands for 
information by investors.  
 
-Investigations allow regulatory bodies to 
understand the effectiveness of their regulations 
on risk disclosure development while this study 
indicates that mandatory risk disclosure reflects 
the level of risk disclosure but it is still 
insufficient compared to developed countries.  
 
-Developing a methodological approach and 
examining risk disclosure. 
 
-To provide valuable 
proof of the need to 
revisit the current 
regulations and 
standards to improve 
the quality of risk 
disclosure and to 
comply with 
international 
accounting policy.  
 
















factors on risk 
disclosure due 






study in the 
Malaysian 
context. 














and race of 
chairman of the 





















insignificant),  race of 




that affect risk 
disclosure level 
are: board size, 
the number of 
independent 
non-executive 
directors on the 
board, and the 
audit committee 
independent. 
-To contribute to agency theory and 
cultural theory which focus on 
monitoring role of best practices of 
corporate governance in the 
companies.  
 
-The evidence of underlying factors 
that could affect risk disclosure in 
Malaysian firms’ annual reports. 
 
-The prevalent doubt in literature on 
the notion that board size, independent 
non-executive directors and audit 
committee independent affect the level 
of risk disclosure has been supported. 
Need to investigate 
other corporate 
governance factors to 
highlight best 
practice of code of 
corporate governance 
in order to improve 







Research Gap RQs Findings Conclusion Contribution Implication 




practices on the 
cost of equity 
capital and market 
reaction. 
No previous study 
in the Malaysian 
context. 
Does the risk 
disclosure 
practice affect the 
cost of equity 






There is a significant 
negative relationship 
between the risk 
disclosure and the cost 
of equity capital, 
significant and 
negative with stock 
price volatility, and 
significant and 
positive relationship 






cost of equity 
capital and its 
proxies in an 
imperfect market.  
-Contribute to capital need theory 
and signaling theory. 
 
-Development of using different 
methods to estimate the cost of 
equity capital. 
Policymakers should 
ensure that any new 
standards will help 
improve the 
corporate disclosure 
to enable investors to 
make informed 
decisions based on 
information and after 
careful consideration 
of costs and benefits 











1.8 Scope of the Study 
Both content and empirical analyses were used in this study. Content analysis 
explained the subject matter being investigated; and includes characteristics of 
organizations, people and objects (Zikmund et al., 2000), hence, content analysis is 
used to find out the presence of certain texts or particular concepts found in a text. 
The empirical method includes observation and experiments that will assist in the 
final analysis of the subject at hand. Following content and empirical analyses, this 
study provides the content analysis of risk disclosure investigation of the trend and 
growth of risk disclosure with keeping in line of regulation development for the 
period of 2001-2011. Subsequently, it empirically examined the relationship between 
corporate governance and the level of risk disclosure. Finally, it provides the 
empirical relationship of risk disclosure on the cost of equity capital and its proxies. 
To achieve the study objectives, this research was conducted in non-financial listed 
companies of Bursa Malaysia for the years 2001 to 2011. The years 1998 to 2011 
provided the data required for this research to construct firm-year observation for the 
period from 2001 to 2011.  
1.9 Outline of the Thesis 
There are six chapters in this thesis. Chapter 1 discusses the research problem, 
research objectives along with the research questions, and the significance of the 
research. Chapter 2 provides the review of risk disclosure in Malaysia and risk 
disclosure concept. Chapter 3 focuses on the literature review and hypotheses 
development while chapter 4 discusses the research methodology in connection with 
the testing of the study hypotheses. Chapter 5 and chapter 6 present the results and 
discuss the findings, contributions and implementation of practices and theories of the 
study. This is followed by description of the limitations of the study and possible 




This chapter explained the issues raised in the study and their significance and 
specified the three research objectives. First, this study evaluated the content analysis 
for risk disclosure investigation to determine the trend and growth of risk disclosure 
and keeping in line with the regulation development for the period from 2001-2011. 
Second, it evaluated the empirical examination of the relationship between corporate 
governance and the level of risk disclosure. Finally, it evaluated the empirical 
relationship of risk disclosure and the cost of equity capital and its proxies. In line 
with the study objectives, this research was carried out in non-financial listed 
companies of Bursa Malaysia covering the period from 2001 to 2011.  
1.11 Terminologies 
Specific terminologies used in this study are defined as follows: 
•Risk disclosure: Risk disclosure refers to information which firms disclose 
about their own risk exposure and semantic properties of the information disclosed, 
which include economic signs (monetary and non-monetary), type of measure (past 
and future), outlook (good, bad, and neutral), and type of disclosure (voluntary and 
mandatory) (Oliveira et al., 2011a). Firms try to gratify accounting information users’ 
needs by disclosing more information about different risks being faced and the 
sustainability of their operations(Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012). The availability of 
this  information enables interested parties to achieve better assessments of  current 
and future risks, for the optimization of their revenues through balanced portfolio 
diversification (Abraham and Cox, 2007). Risk disclosure assists  investors in their 
investment decision-making  according to their  evaluation of disclosed information 
that allows them to weigh various risk levels before making decisions based on 
expected return and risk considerations (Cabedo and Tirado, 2004). Moreover, risk 
disclosure will lead to a better risk management, as well as improvement of 
accountability for stewardship, investor protection, and the usefulness of financial 
reporting (ICAEW, 1997).  
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•Corporate Governance: The total structure of rules and practices followed by 
a Board of Directors to ensure that the company’s relationship with its various 
stakeholders (financiers, customers, management, employees, government, and the 
community) is accountable, fair, and transparent.   
•Information asymmetry: This is a situation where there is imperfect 
knowledge. In particular it occurs when one party has different information to 
another. It means that information asymmetry is the gap information between 
corporate governance (insider) and investors (Aboody and Lev, 2000). This indicates 
that when information asymmetry between managers and investors increases, 
investors claim more cost of capital because of associated risk (Lambert et al., 2011).  
•Cost of equity capital: Cost of equity is in financial theory, the return that 
stockholders require for a company. The shareholders can rightly make a claim on the 
value of the company following any share issue, with such claim repaid after debt. As 
such, shareholders enjoy the double benefits of a  dividend and an increase in their 
share  value (Shi and Kim, 2007).  
•Stock price volatility: Stock price volatility refers to the potential for a 
given stock to experience a drastic decrease or increase in value within a 
predetermined period of time. Investors evaluate the volatility of stock before making 
a decision to purchase a new stock offering, buy additional shares of a stock already 
in their portfolio, or sell stock currently in the possession of the investor. The idea 
behind understanding stock volatility is to arrange investments so that a maximum 
return with minimal opportunities for loss is achieved (Zhang and Ding, 2006). In 
addition, price volatility is the result of differences among traders, arising to some 
degree from information asymmetry. In the same way, because the volatility of stock 
price is influenced by several factors (size, volume of trading, the firm’s systematic 
risk beta and the type of investors attracted to the firm) (Bushee and Noe, 2000; 
Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Zhang and Ding, 2006).  
•Stock trading turnover: It refers to 
the quantum of shares, bonds or contracts traded in a particular period for 
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a security or a whole exchange. Trading volume volatility can be affected by investor 
reaction in the market or by any activity from the firm to the market. The volume of 
trade is a proxy that measures the shares liquidity by convincing willing investors to 
buy/sell. Trading volumes decline when the level of information asymmetry is high 
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